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Enhancing Tax Compliance through Coercive
and Legitimate Power of Tax Authorities by
Concurrently Diminishing or Facilitating Trust
in Tax Authorities
EVA HOFMANN, KATHARINA GANGL, ERICH KIRCHLER, and
JENNIFER STARK
Both coercion, such as strict auditing and the use of fines, and legitimate
procedures, such as assistance by tax authorities, are often discussed as
means of enhancing tax compliance. However, the psychological mechanisms
that determine the effectiveness of each strategy are not clear. Although
highly relevant, there is rare empirical literature examining the effects of both
strategies applied in combination. It is assumed that coercion decreases implicit
trust in tax authorities, leading to the perception of a hostile antagonistic tax
climate and enforced tax compliance. Conversely, it is suggested that legitimate
power increases reason-based trust in the tax authorities, leading to the percep-
tion of a service climate and eventually to voluntary cooperation. The combi-
nation of both strategies is assumed to cause greater levels of intended
compliance than each strategy alone. We conducted two experimental studies
with convenience samples of 261 taxpayers overall. The studies describe tax
authorities as having low or high coercive power (e.g., imposing lenient or
severe sanctions) and/or low or high legitimate power (e.g., having nontrans-
parent or transparent procedures). Data analyses provide supportive evidence
for the assumptions regarding the impact on intended tax compliance. Coercive
power did not reduce implicit trust in tax authorities; however, it had an effect
on reason-based trust, interaction climate, and intended tax compliance if
applied solely. When wielded in combination with legitimate power, it had no
effect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax collection is an important endeavor for tax authorities. Essential strat-
egies for increasing tax compliance include deterrence and assistance through
legitimated procedures (Gangl et al. 2012; Alm and Torgler 2011;
Braithwaite 2003). Taxpayers’ trust in authorities, as well as in fellow citi-
zens, fosters honest tax contributions as well (Gangl et al. 2012; Alm and
Torgler 2011; Braithwaite 2003). Coercion is based on tax audits and fines if
tax evasion is detected (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). Legitimacy is based
on transparency, fairness, and participation of tax authorities (Alm et al.
2010; Feld and Frey 2007; Wenzel 2002). Trust is based on social norms
(Coleman 2007; Wenzel 2004) or moral suasion (Ariel 2012; Alm and Torgler
2011; Torgler 2004). Existing research indicates that coercion and legitimacy
should be applied simultaneously in order to increase tax compliance among
citizens (Alm and Torgler 2011; Braithwaite 2003). The combination of these
different measures may be more efficient in influencing tax compliance than
either measure alone (Gangl et al. 2013). However, whether or not underly-
ing psychological processes, such as the level of trust a taxpayer has in tax
authorities provide an explanation for the effectiveness of a combination of
strategies has not been explored. Shedding light on these underlying mecha-
nisms is essential to tax researchers and practitioners in order to understand
how measures to increase tax compliance work and can be applied most
effectively.
The slippery slope framework (Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl 2008) explores
the mechanisms used by authorities to influence taxpayer decision making
and assure tax compliance. Previous research suggests that trust in tax
authorities is influenced by whether power is coercive or legitimate creating
different climates and motivations to comply (Gangl et al. 2012). They
undertook laboratory experiments that manipulated tax authorities’ power
and trustworthiness. The studies confirm the assumptions of the slippery
slope framework (Kogler et al. 2013; Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler 2010)
and offer a more nuanced picture of the mechanisms that affect tax
compliance. We find that the combination of high power and high trustwor-
thiness leads to overall higher tax compliance than power or trustworthiness
alone. This may be because when power is combined with trustworthiness it
is perceived as legitimate expert power that motivates compliance. Thus, how
power is implemented may be a key determinant of tax compliance.
This article explores the impact of coercive power and legitimate power on
psychological processes and subsequent tax compliance. In the three experi-
ments we conducted, coercive power and legitimate power were manipulated
independently and in combination by applying scenarios of fictitious tax
authorities. In Study 1, we separately examine (1) the effect of coercive power
on trust in authorities and (2) the effect of legitimate power on trust in
authorities. The study also examines the climate between tax authorities and
taxpayers, and its effect on motivation for taxpayers to comply with the
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authority. In Study 2, we examine the combined effects of coercive power and
legitimate power on the above-mentioned underlying processes and tax
compliance. Study 1 serves to confirm the theoretical assumptions on the
impact of coercive power and of legitimate power. Study 2 explores the
effects of using a combination of coercive and legitimate power since it is
the currently predominant practice used by taxation authorities.
In the following part, we present the theoretical background for our work.
While the distinction between coercive power and legitimate power is com-
paratively novel to tax research, it has been a well-established distinction in
social psychology for decades. We are confident that the insights of the social
psychology literature provide an understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms that cause the effects of coercive power and legitimate power. Parts III
and IV report on the experiments in which we manipulate low versus high
levels of coercive power and legitimate power, either separately or in
combination. Part V summarizes the results and discusses the findings.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. POWER
Scholars in the field of social psychology have often sought to explicitly
distinguish between different qualities of power (Tyler 2006; Turner 2005;
French and Raven 1959). Turner (2005) and Tyler (2006), for instance, have
assumed that depending on the way power is exercised, two qualities of
power can be distinguished: coercive power and legitimate power.
Coercive or harsh power manifests itself through negative and positive
reinforcements such as through the imposition of sanctions and the granting
of benefits (Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998). While negative
reinforcement, such as fines and imprisonment, are common and well-proven
measures used by tax authorities (Becker 1968), positive reinforcement in the
form of rewards for honest taxpaying is more unusual. Nevertheless, accord-
ing to psychological theory of operant conditioning (Skinner 1947), both
negative and positive reinforcement provoke tax compliance by penalizing
unwanted, and by reinforcing wanted, tax behavior. Field experiments indi-
cate that coercive power, that is, audits and fines, affect tax compliance
(Kleven et al. 2011; Hasseldine et al. 2007). This affect is either weak and can
be contradictory (Ariel 2012; Blackwell 2010; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and
Christian 2001). Laboratory experiments also reported that positive rein-
forcement in the form of rewards increased tax compliance (Feld, Frey, and
Torgler 2006; Torgler 2003).
In contrast, legitimate or soft power is characterized by the legitimacy of the
power institutions (Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 1998). Subdimen-
sions of legitimate power include the provision of relevant information, the
knowledge and skills of the authority, as well as the authority’s capacity to
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make taxpayers identify with its goals and values (Raven et al. 1998). Labo-
ratory experiments suggest that service provision (Alm et al. 2010), that is,
information power, has a positive impact on tax compliance. Also, participa-
tion in the tax procedure (Wahl, Muehlbacher, and Kirchler 2010; Feld and
Frey 2002), that is, power of identification, is shown to promote tax compli-
ance in laboratory experiments. Survey data among taxpayers indicate a
positive relation between legitimacy, that is, power of position, provision of
relevant information, knowledge and skills, and tax compliance (Gangl et al.
2013; Hartner et al. 2011). Finally, good governance approximating legitimate
power is assumed to positively affect taxpayers’ willingness to comply with tax
laws (Cummings et al. 2009; Smith and Stalans 1991).
B. THE IMPACT OF COERCIVE POWER AND LEGITIMATE POWER ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND TAX COMPLIANCE
The extension of the slippery slope framework (Gangl et al. 2012; Kirchler,
Hofmann, and Gangl 2012) assumes that coercive power decreases implicit
trust in authorities, which generates an antagonistic climate and enforced
compliance by the taxpayers. The basis of implicit trust, on the other hand,
is an unconscious reaction generated by shared norms and values, and a sense
of social identity. Learning with time that institutions with certain charac-
teristics can be trusted enables implicit trust reactions in the future
(Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010). In the tax context, for instance, implicit
trust is established through years of good experiences with tax authorities.
An antagonistic climate characterizes itself by a “cops and robbers” attitude
between the tax authorities and the taxpayers (Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl
2008). The perception is that tax authorities are “cops,” eager to catch tax
evaders and punish them, while taxpayers are “robbers,” unwilling to pay
taxes and hiding from the authorities. The use of coercive power by the
taxation authority breeds suspicion and mistrust. This can result in a vicious
cycle where the authorities increase their use of coercion while taxpayers
increase their use of evasion or avoidance mechanisms. Ultimately, increased
use of evasion by the taxpayer increases the use of coercive powers of the
authority, and the cycle continues (Braithwaite 2003; Feld and Frey 2002;
Torgler 2002). As a consequence, coercive power is assumed to inhibit
implicit trust toward the tax authority and forces taxpayers to pay their taxes;
they only pay because they are pressed to do so.
In contrast, legitimate power is suggested to increase reason-based trust
and to stimulate a service climate, and therefore elicit voluntary cooperation
by taxpayers. The basis of taxpayers’ reason-based trust is rational consid-
erations of the authorities’ trustworthiness such as their competence, moti-
vation, or benevolence (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010). Legitimate power
increases reason-based trust, because it provides the taxpayers with reasons
to trust such as the authorities’ expertise in tax issues and their willingness to
share valuable information with the taxpayers. When legitimate power is
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prevalent in a service climate, it elicits voluntary cooperation. In such a
service climate, taxpayers comply with tax law because they believe that
authorities will reciprocate with cooperation. The interaction is characterized
by clearly defined fair-play rules, and taxpayers’ motivation to pay taxes is
voluntary because taxpayers perceive paying honestly as the easiest and most
hassle free way to handle tax issues. Figure 1 displays the different motiva-
tional paths through which coercive power and legitimate power affect tax
compliance.
We are confident, that by analyzing coercive power and legitimate power
separately, and by distinguishing between different qualities of trust, that is,
implicit trust and reason-based trust, we are able to clarify the psychological
processes that are responsible for tax compliance. This then, fundamentally
provides a contribution to current understandings in taxation research.
Moreover, by analyzing the combined effects of both coercive power and
legitimate power, we can explain the findings of earlier experiments in which
high power and high trustworthiness have produced the highest level of tax
compliance (Kogler et al. 2013; Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler, 2010). The
findings of these experiments suggest that power and trust are not indepen-
dent determinants of tax compliance but that it is in fact the interaction
between the two that is relevant. We assume that the shape of mutual inter-
action between power and trust depends on the qualities of that power and
trust. Experimental manipulation of high power, in combination with a low
degree of trustworthiness on the part of authorities, may be interpreted as
coercion, while high power in combination with high trustworthiness is likely
to be perceived as legitimate expert power, producing the highest degree of
tax compliance. A high degree of trustworthiness among the authorities,
combined with low power, may produce some reason-based trust but can
Reason-based trustImplicit trust Legitimate power Coercive power 
Antagonistic
climate 
Enforced
compliance 
Voluntary 
cooperation 
Service 
climate 
+-
-
Figure 1. The Impact of Coercive and Legitimate Power on Trust, The Interaction
Climate, and the Motivation to Comply.
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also breed suspicion that the authorities are unable to guarantee tax compli-
ance by fellow citizens and are thus unable to combat free riders. Addition-
ally, with the combination of power qualities, we can shed light on the
underlying psychological processes that occur with the combination of coer-
cive and legitimate power. Finally, it also allows valuable and new insights
into the impact of the current practice of tax authorities to apply coercive
power as well as legitimate power.
We conducted two studies to examine the impact of coercive and legitimate
power. In Study 1, we investigate two experiments that examine the impact of
coercive power and legitimate power, respectively, on intended tax compli-
ance, trust, the underlying motivation to pay taxes, and the perceived inter-
action climate. Study 2 goes a step further and examines a combination of
coercive and legitimate power.
Study 1 proves the impact of coercive power on intended tax compliance
(e.g., Hasseldine et al. 2007), but the study especially contributes to tax
research by shedding light on the underlying psychological processes. In
addition, it backs up findings of the impact of legitimate power on intended
tax compliance (Alm and Torgler 2011; Feld and Frey 2007; Wenzel 2002)
and again reveals the underlying psychological processes. As pure coercive
power or legitimate power are seldom wielded, the effect of combined forms
of power is of high theoretical and practical interest.
Study 2 exceeds current tax research by combining both forms of power
and examining the combined impact on intended tax compliance. Again,
Study 2 is especially valuable because it provides unprecedented insight by
identifying the underlying psychological processes. Based on earlier findings,
the combination of high coercive power and high legitimate power—which
could be perceived as especially high legitimate power—prompts the highest
intended tax payments. This, in turn, compares combinations of high coer-
cive power with low legitimate power or high legitimate power combined
with low coercive power. Tax authorities wielding high coercive and high
legitimate power are legitimized professionals protecting honest taxpayers
from the free riders who look to exploit other citizens. Thus, coercive power
applies to tax evaders but is not as applicable to oneself. This approach
resembles a “carrot and stick” policy (Braithwaite 2001) in which authorities
recognize those taxpayers worthy of prosecution and those deserving encour-
agement and support. If high legitimate power wields low coercive power, we
perceive high trustworthiness and expect fairly high intended tax compliance.
Moreover, we perceive such authorities as benevolent toward taxpayers but
probably without sufficient measures at their disposal to restrain free riders
from exploitation. Tax authorities holding high coercive power but low
legitimate power are perceived as untrustworthy and, because of the effect of
coercion, are unlikely to elicit tax compliance. In such a country, taxpayers
would perceive authorities as dictatorial and authoritarian, applying arbi-
trary measures, threatening taxpayers, or causing fear mongering. The com-
bination of low coercive power and low legitimate power is assumed to
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produce the lowest degree of intended tax compliance because authorities are
perceived as being highly untrustworthy. We see such laissez-faire authorities
as incapable of effectively levying and collecting taxes. Study 2 examines
whether high coercive power leads to lower implicit trust and to increases in
enforced compliance. Further, it investigates whether coercive power leads to
a more distinct antagonistic climate and to intentions of higher tax payments
than low coercive power. Finally, it examines whether high legitimate power
triggers more reason-based trust, increases voluntary cooperation, creates a
more distinct service climate, and prompts intentions for higher tax payments
than low legitimate power.
Studies 1 and 2 show that coercive and/or legitimate descriptions of tax
authorities are sufficient to shape intended tax behavior in a fictitious
example and, as such, coercive and legitimate behaviors are unnecessary.
III. STUDY 1
Study 1 is comprised of two parts, Study 1a and Study 1b, which together
allow us to examine the impact of coercive and legitimate power, respectively.
Study 1a investigates whether high coercive power leads to high intended tax
compliance, low implicit trust, enforced compliance, and to the perception of
an antagonistic interaction climate. Study 1b examines the positive influence
of legitimate power on intended tax compliance, reason-based trust, volun-
tary cooperation, and the perception of a service climate.
A. STUDY 1A
1. Participants
A convenience sample of sixty-two taxpayers recruited from acquaintances
of university members took part in the study (53 percent female; M[age] =
31.81 years, SD[age] = 12.09, range 18–69). A precondition for participation
was that they were obliged to pay income tax; persons without taxable
income were not permitted. Most participants held final general qualifica-
tions for university entrance (47 percent) or a university degree (47 percent).
About three-quarters of participants (74 percent) were employed; an addi-
tional 16 percent were self-employed.
2. Procedure and Instrument
We used scenarios in an online questionnaire in which the tax authority of
a fictitious country was presented as having either high or low coercive
power (Box 1). The fictitious scenario in the experimental questionnaire was
necessary to manipulate pure high or low coercive power. Although the
296 LAW & POLICY July 2014
© 2014 The Authors
Law & Policy published by University of Denver/Colorado Seminary and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
experimental design was of lower external validity than if existing authorities
were described, it allowed precise testing of the impact of coercive power.
Participants could put themselves in the fictitious scenario without reminders
of real life conditions. Tax authorities in scenarios with high coercive power,
for instance were strict, as opposed to lenient, toward tax evaders. Partici-
pants were asked to imagine living in a country in which authorities had
either high or low coercive power (1st Government), and then they were
asked to imagine experiencing a radical change of government (2nd Govern-
ment), to one in which the power of the tax authorities was either compara-
tively expanded or diminished. Although taxpayers very rarely experience
such a radical change in their lifetimes, this design allows for the investigation
of differences in the perception of power within subjects, reducing error
variance and increasing statistical power. The experimental design was a 2
(low coercive power versus high coercive power) × 2 (1st Government versus
2nd Government) repeated measures ANOVA-design.
After reading each scenario, participants responded to two items that
assessed their intended tax compliance, and eighty-seven statements that
assessed constructs of the extension of the slippery slope framework on a
6-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree to 6 = totally agree). While scales
from the TAX-I (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010) were applied for enforced com-
pliance and the perception of an antagonistic climate, respectively, the items
used to assess voluntary cooperation were adapted from the scale capitula-
tion described in Braithwaite’s (2003) inventory of motivational postures.
The items for intended tax compliance coercive power, legitimate power,
implicit trust, reason-based trust, and the perception of a service climate were
newly developed based on the respective concepts (Gangl et al. 2012;
Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010; Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky
1998). We analyzed all scales with principal component analysis and adapted
them if reliability, as measured via Cronbach-α, was low. Based on this
analysis, we excluded some items from the scales’ coercive power and implicit
trust. We present descriptive statistics of the final scales in Table 1.
3. Manipulation Check for Low Versus High Coercive Power
To examine the success of the manipulation of coercive power, we conducted
a 2 (low coercive power versus high coercive power) × 2 (1st Government
Box 1. Low and High Coercive Power Scenario
The sanctions for tax evasion in Tovland are very high [low]. If tax evasion is discovered, you
[do not] have to anticipate severe sanctions. The tax authority is [not] lenient toward tax
evaders.
On the contrary, after tax audits, there are major [minor] financial rewards for correct tax
filing independent of the amount of your income. This considerable [moderate] amount is
credited to the following year’s tax return.
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versus 2nd Government) repeated measures ANOVA, in which perceived
coercive power (Cronbach-α = .76) was the dependent variable. The results
revealed a main effect of coercive power manipulation (F(1, 60) = 33.24, p >
.001, η2 = .36). Neither the sequence of governments (F(1, 60) = 0.43, p = .51)
nor the interaction between coercive power and the sequence of governments
reached significance (F(1, 60) = 0.04, p = .84). As analyses conducted with
additional control groups in which power did not change from the first to the
second government have shown, the contrast between high coercive power
and low coercive power had no impact on the perception of coercive power.
Low coercive power (1st Government: M = 3.41, SD = 1.35; 2nd Govern-
ment: M = 3.24, SD = 1.25) and high coercive power (1st Government: M =
4.71, SD = 1.05; 2nd Government: M = 4.78, SD = 1.17) were in accordance
with the manipulation. After reading the high coercive power scenario, for
instance, participants perceived that the tax authorities were more able to
cause taxpayers inconvenience and to severely punish tax evaders than par-
ticipants who had read the low coercive power scenario. When filling in the
coercive power items, they were not able to read the scenario text again. This
essentially means that we assessed participants’ sentiments towards the ficti-
tious tax authorities but not the wording of the scenario text.
4. Results
(a) Impact of Low Coercive Power Versus High Coercive Power on
Intended Tax Compliance
We investigated the hypothesis that high coercive power leads to higher
intended tax compliance. A 2 (low coercive power versus high coercive
power) × 2 (1st Government versus 2nd Government) repeated measures
ANOVA revealed an effect of coercive power on intended tax compliance
(F(1,60) = 20.08, p < .001, η2 = .25). There was no significant main effect of
the sequence of governments (F(1, 60) = 0.11, p = .74); nor was there an
interaction effect (F(1, 60) = 0.25, p = .62). Hence, high coercive power
prompts higher intended tax compliance. The respective means are displayed
in Table 1.
(b) Impact of Low Coercive Power Versus High Coercive Power on
Implicit Trust, Enforced Compliance, and Antagonistic Climate
A 2 (low coercive power versus high coercive power) × 2 (1st Government
versus 2nd Government) repeated measures MANOVA—with implicit
trust, enforced compliance, and the perception of an antagonistic climate as
dependent variable —revealed a main effect of coercive power (F(3, 58) =
8.62, p < .001, η2 = .31), no significant effect as a result of the sequence of
governments (F(3, 58) = 0.49, p = .70) and no interaction effect (F(3, 58) =
0.07, p = .97).
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Specifically, the univariate analyses revealed significant main effects of
coercive power intensity for enforced compliance (F(1, 60) = 24.98, p <
.001, η2 = .29) and for the antagonistic climate (F(1, 60) = 5.98, p < .05,
η2 = .09). However, there was no main effect of coercive power on
implicit trust (F(1, 60) = 0.08, p = .83). The respective means are displayed in
Table 1.
5. Discussion
Study 1a shows that high coercive power can lead to higher intended tax
compliance, feelings of enforced compliance, and to the perception of an
antagonistic climate. Implicit trust did not vary with variations in the amount
of coercive power. Coercive power influenced intended tax compliance
through the predicted processes, with the exception that coercive power had
no impact on implicit trust. Thus, Study 1a supports experimental findings
that high fines and frequent audits induce higher tax compliance (e.g., Park
and Hyun 2003). However, it also shows that the actual manipulation of the
amount of fines and the frequency of audits are not crucial, but the simple
description of the tax authorities as severely fining and strictly auditing
without any numeral specification are crucial. As the impact of described
coercive power can be confirmed, the impact of legitimate power, that is,
power because of legitimacy of the position of the tax authorities, their
knowledge and skills, their capacity to be figures for identification, and their
willingness to offer and provide relevant information (Raven, Schwarzwald,
and Koslowsky 1998), is still in need of investigation. While earlier studies
have covered parts of legitimate power (e.g., service quality [Gangl et al.
2013]), it has not been investigated inclusively.
Table 1. Scales for Variables of the Extension of the Slippery Slope Framework for
the Coercive Power Experiment (N = 62)
Conditions
1st gov’t 2nd gov’t 1st gov’t 2nd gov’t
Cronbach-α
Low High High Low
N 30 32
Scale M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Intended tax compliance 4.13 (1.57) 4.88 (1.35) 5.08 (1.09) 4.14 (1.55) .83
Implicit trust 2.17 (1.10) 2.23 (1.19) 1.88 (0.98) 1.90 (1.24) .86
Reason-based trust 3.57 (0.72) 3.70 (0.63) 3.41 (0.63) 3.20 (0.75) .78
Enforced compliance 2.90 (1.28) 3.99 (1.44) 4.01 (1.36) 2.97 (1.22) .83
Voluntary cooperation 3.19 (1.01) 3.31 (1.10) 2.93 (1.05) 2.72 (1.32) .72
Antagonistic climate 3.07 (1.09) 3.42 (0.95) 3.49 (0.96) 3.10 (1.23) .62
Service climate 3.47 (1.20) 3.55 (1.09) 3.31 (1.07) 2.94 (1.16) .45
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B. STUDY 1B
1. Participants
A convenience sample of seventy-eight taxpayers recruited from acquain-
tances of university members took part in the study (44 percent female;
M[age] = 31.67 years, SD[age] = 10.88, range 18–64). A precondition for
participation was again that they had to pay income tax; persons without a
taxable income were not permitted. Most participants held final general
qualifications for university entrance (42 percent) or a university degree (39
percent). More than half of all participants (53 percent) were employed; an
additional 14 percent were self-employed.
2. Procedure and Instrument
The procedure and instrument used in Study 1b were identical to those used
in Study 1a except for the scenarios that manipulated high and low degrees of
legitimate power. Tax authorities with low legitimate power, as opposed to
high legitimate power, were incompetent versus competent professionals
(Box 2). The experimental design was a 2 (low legitimate power versus high
legitimate power) × 2 (1st Government versus 2nd Government) repeated
measure ANOVA-design. We present descriptive statistics of the scales in
Table 2.
3. Manipulation Check for Low Versus High Legitimate Power
We undertook the manipulation check for legitimate power with a 2 (low
legitimate power versus high legitimate power) × 2 (1st Government versus
Box 2. Low and High Legitimate Power Scenario
The current government was formed after a democratic election, whereby independent
observers report a regular [irregular] procedure. The government provides the tax authority
with a consistently [inconsistently] worded law to prosecute tax evaders.
It is known that the tax authority makes [no] allowances with taxpayers regarding small
errors and is also [not] forthcoming at audits.
The tax authority in Tovland proves to be [little] efficient. The competence of its employees
regarding their advice for taxpayers and the processing of audits is well known [questioned].
In addition, the tax authority of Tovland offers ample [very little] information to support the
preparation of the tax return. Similarly, the audit and sanctions procedure for tax evaders are
very transparent [nontransparent].
In general, the tax authority of Tovland has a good [bad] reputation and is [not] respected for
its work.
It has been shown that citizens, based on the degree of their cooperation with the tax
authority, have great [little] influence on the functioning of the tax authority and therefore on
the state.
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2nd Government) repeated measures ANOVA, in which perceived legiti-
mate power (Cronbach-α = .93) was the dependent variable. The analysis
revealed a main effect of legitimate power (F(1, 76) = 230.31, p < .001,
η2 = .75), a significant effect as a result of the sequence of governments
(F(1, 76) = 6.30, p < .05, η2 = .08) and no interaction effect (F(1, 76) = 1.34,
p = .25). As analyses conducted with additional control groups in which
power did not change from the first to the second government have
shown, the contrast between high legitimate power and low legitimate
power had an impact on the perception of legitimate power. After a change
from high to low legitimate power, participants perceive legitimate power
as higher (M = 3.22, SD = 0.61) as compared to that in the scenario in
which power was low under both the first and the second government (M
= 2.81, SD = 0.61). This indicates that high legitimate power might have
continued to have an effect even after the reduction of said power. Never-
theless, the manipulation worked well, as low legitimate power (1st Gov-
ernment: M = 2.85, SD = 0.62; 2nd Government: M = 3.22, SD = 0.61) and
high legitimate power (1st Government: M = 4.60, SD = 0.64, 2nd Gov-
ernment: M = 4.45, SD = 0.61) were perceived as such. When we reduced
power in the second government, the effect of high legitimate power seemed
to continue to have an effect. After reading the high legitimate power sce-
nario, for instance, participants felt that the tax authorities were more effi-
ciently collecting taxes and were more appreciated by taxpayers for
providing comprehensive information and advice than participants who
had read the low legitimate power scenario. Again, participants were
unable to read the scenario text while filling in the items so that we could
assess sentiments toward the fictitious tax authorities but not the wording
of the scenario text.
4. Results
(a) Impact of Low Versus High Legitimate Power on
Intended Tax Compliance
We investigated the hypothesis that high legitimate power leads to higher
intended tax compliance. Results of a 2 (low legitimate power versus high
legitimate power) × 2 (1st Government versus 2nd Government) repeated
measures ANOVA revealed that legitimate power (F(1, 76) = 19.49, p <
.001, η2 = .20) and the sequence of governments (F(1, 76) = 11.97, p = .001,
η2 = .14) both had significant effects on intended tax compliance. We found
no significant interaction effect (F(1, 76) = 2.11, p = .15). High legitimate
power led, on average, to higher intentions of tax compliance than did low
legitimate power. Intended tax compliance under the second government
was lower than under the first. The respective means are displayed in
Table 2.
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(b) Impact of Low Legitimate Power Versus High Legitimate Power on
Reason-Based Trust, Voluntary Cooperation, and Service Climate
The results of a 2 (low legitimate power versus high legitimate power) × 2
(1st Government versus 2nd Government) repeated measures MANOVA
showed a main effect of legitimate power (F(3, 74) = 71.83, p < .001,
η2 = .74), no significant main effect as a result of the sequence of govern-
ments (F(3, 74) = 1.22, p = .31), and no interaction effect (F(3, 74) = 1.10,
p = .35).
Univariate analyses revealed that legitimate power had a significant impact
on reason-based trust (F(1, 76) = 118.90, p < .001, η2 = .61), voluntary
cooperation (F(1, 76) = 175.20, p < .001, η2 = .70), and the perceptions of a
service climate (F(1, 76) = 126.65, p < .001, η2 = .63). The respective means are
displayed in Table 1.
5. Discussion
Study 1b shows that high legitimate power resulted in high intended tax
compliance, high reason-based trust, high voluntary cooperation, and the
perception of a distinct service climate. Legitimate power influences
intended tax compliance through the predicted processes. Study 1b backs
up findings (e.g., Gangl et al. 2013) that stress supportive procedures of tax
authorities facilitate tax compliance. Again, in the current study it was not
the legitimate processes but the description of a legitimate tax authority
that was necessary to show modifications in taxpayers’ behaviors. Never-
theless, in Study 1, coercive power and legitimate power are tested sepa-
rately. The effects of the two forces in combination are still to be
investigated.
Table 2. Scales for Variables of the Extension of the Slippery Slope Framework for
the Legitimate Power Experiment (N = 78)
Conditions
1st gov’t 2nd gov’t 1st gov’t 2nd gov’t
Cronbach-α
Low High High Low
N 42 36
Scale M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Intended tax compliance 4.38 (1.22) 5.26 (0.89) 4.28 (1.24) 3.83 (1.35) .67
Implicit trust 1.26 (0.73) 2.51 (1.05) 2.83 (1.47) 1.54 (0.60) .89
Reason-based trust 2.76 (0.46) 3.64 (0.58) 3.70 (0.58) 2.85 (0.54) .94
Enforced compliance 3.51 (1.42) 3.40 (1.56) 3.56 (1.27) 3.92 (1.35) .92
Voluntary cooperation 2.41 (0.82) 4.18 (1.14) 4.06 (1.20) 2.09 (0.85) .88
Antagonistic climate 4.59 (1.09) 2.33 (0.97) 2.73 (1.25) 4.53 (1.38) .95
Service climate 2.38 (1.09) 4.48 (1.07) 4.25 (1.08) 2.58 (1.03) .80
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IV. STUDY 2
Study 2 tests the impact of coercive power and legitimate power combined
on intended tax compliance. It was assumed that high coercive power
and high legitimate power exercised in combination would generate the
highest degree of intended tax compliance because they result in the tax
authority being perceived as a legitimate expert power holding ample
trustworthiness. Study 2 examines if there are correlating results with
Study 1, which distinguishes the separate impact of coercive and legiti-
mate power on trust, the climate between tax authorities and taxpayers,
motivations of enforced compliance, and on the levels of voluntary
cooperation.
A. PARTICIPANTS
A convenience sample of 121 taxpayers recruited from acquaintances of
university members (50.4 percent females; M[age] = 38.77 years, SD[age] =
12.15, range 20–68) participated in the study. A precondition for participa-
tion was that they had to pay income tax; persons without a taxable income
were not permitted. Most participants held a university degree (47.9 percent)
or final general qualifications for university entrance (28.1 percent). More
than half of the participants (61.2 percent) were employed; an additional 38.4
percent were self-employed.
B. PROCEDURE AND INSTRUMENT
The procedure and instrument were similar to those in Study 1, except that
tax authorities in this exercise held either low coercive power or high
coercive power combined with either low legitimate power or high legiti-
mate power. We presented a case study of a fictitious country to partici-
pants, which underwent no change from one government to another. Tax
authorities holding low coercive power and high legitimate power were
lenient toward tax evaders and competent. Tax authorities holding high
coercive power and low legitimate power were strict toward tax evaders
and incompetent. Tax authorities wielding low coercive power and low
legitimate power were lenient toward tax evaders and incompetent.
Finally, tax authorities holding high coercive power and high legitimate
power were strict toward tax evaders and competent (Box 3). The experi-
ment employed a 2 (low coercive power versus high coercive power) × 2
(low legitimate power versus high legitimate power) design. The question-
naire consisted of seventy-two items that resembled the scales in Study 1,
but in order to achieve improved reliability, we changed some items, and as
such, reduced the number of total items. We present scale statistics in
Table 3.
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C. MANIPULATION CHECK FOR LOW AND HIGH COERCIVE POWER AND FOR
LOW AND HIGH LEGITIMATE POWER
For the manipulation check, we conducted a 2 (low coercive power versus
high coercive power) × 2 (low legitimate power versus high legitimate power)
MANOVA with perceived coercive power and perceived legitimate power as
dependent variables. The results of univariate analyses showed a significant
main effect of coercive power on the perception of coercive power (F(1, 117)
= 22.07, p < .001, η2 = .16). Also, the perception of legitimate power corre-
sponded with the manipulation (F(1, 117) = 74.12, p < .001, η2 = .39).
Regarding the perception of coercive power, there was a weak significant
interaction effect of coercive power and legitimate power (F(1, 117) = 5.93, p
< .05, η2 = .05); there was no interaction effect, however, as it pertains to the
perception of legitimate power (F(1, 117) = 0.11, p = .74). The manipulation
was successful, as low and high coercive power and low and high legitimate
power were each perceived as having been manipulated in the scenarios.
Reading a scenario including high coercive power participants, for instance,
suggested that the tax authorities were more able to cause taxpayers incon-
venience and to severely punish tax evaders than participants who had read
a scenario comprising low coercive power. After reading a scenario including
high legitimate power, participants felt that tax authorities were collecting
Box 3: Low and High Coercive Power and Low and
High Legitimate Power Scenario
The sanctions for tax evasion in Tovland are very high [low]. If tax evasion is discovered, you
[do not] have to anticipate severe sanctions. The tax authority is [not] lenient toward tax
evaders.
On the contrary, after tax audits, there are major [minor] financial rewards for correct tax
filing independent of the amount of your income. This considerable [moderate] amount is
credited to the following year’s tax return.
The current government was formed after a democratic election, whereby independent
observers report a regular [irregular] procedure. The government provides the tax authority
with a consistently [inconsistently] worded law to prosecute tax evaders.
It is known that the tax authority makes [no] allowances with taxpayers regarding small
errors and is also [not] forthcoming at audits.
The tax authority in Tovland proves to be [little] efficient. The competence of its employees
regarding their advice for taxpayers and the processing of audits is well known [questioned].
In addition, the tax authority of Tovland offers ample [very little] information to support the
preparation of the tax return. Similarly, the audit and sanctions procedure for tax evaders are
very transparent [nontransparent].
In general, the tax authority of Tovland has a good [bad] reputation and is [not] respected for
its work.
It has been shown that citizens, based on the degree of their cooperation with the tax
authority, have great [little] influence on the functioning of the tax authority and therefore on
the state.
304 LAW & POLICY July 2014
© 2014 The Authors
Law & Policy published by University of Denver/Colorado Seminary and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
taxes more efficiently. Further, they were more appreciated by taxpayers for
providing comprehensive information and advice than participants who con-
centrated on a scenario with low legitimate power. Again, participants had
no possibility to read the scenario text while filling in the items so that we
could assess sentiments toward the fictitious tax authorities but not the
wording of the scenario text.
D. RESULTS
1. Impact of Coercive Power and Legitimate Power on
Intended Tax Compliance
A 2 (low coercive power versus high coercive power) × 2 (low legitimate
power versus high legitimate power) ANOVA with intended tax compliance
as the dependent variable showed no main effect of coercive power (F(1, 117)
= 1.00, p = .32) but did reveal an effect of legitimate power (F(1, 117) = 23.67,
p < .001, η2 = .17). We found no interaction effect of coercive and legitimate
power (F(117, 1) < 0.01, p = .998). The respective means are displayed in
Table 4.
2. Impact of Coercive and Legitimate Power on Trust, Motivations,
and Climates
A 2 (low coercive power versus high coercive power) × 2 (low legitimate
power versus high legitimate power) MANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of coercive power (F(4, 114) = 6.78, p < .001, η2 = .19) and of legitimate
power (F(4, 114) = 24.27, p < .001, η2 = .46) but no interaction effect (F(4,
114) = 0.43, p = .78) on the dependent variables implicit trust, reason-based
Table 3. Perception of Coercive and Legitimate Power for the Combined Power
Experiment (N = 121)
Conditions
Low coercive &
low legitimate
power
Low coercive &
high legitimate
power
High coercive &
low legitimate
power
High coercive &
high legitimate
power
Cronbach-α
N 29 31 31 30
Scale M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Perceived
coercive
power
4.30 (1.33) 3.28 (1.16) 4.77 (1.16) 4.78 (0.94) .67
Perceived
legitimate
power
3.31 (1.18) 4.79 (0.84) 3.07 (1.03) 4.68 (0.87) .95
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trust, enforced compliance, voluntary cooperation, perception of an antago-
nistic climate, and perception of a service climate.
The univariate analyses showed no main effects of coercive power (F(1,
117) = 0.37, p = .54) and legitimate power (F(1, 117) = 2.02, p = .16) on
implicit trust. For reason-based trust, there was no main effect of coercive
power (F(1, 117) < 0.01, p = .95), although a main effect of legitimate power
(F(1, 117) = 86.02, p < .001, η2 = .42) was found. Coercive power had a main
effect on enforced compliance (F(1, 117) = 26.29, p < .001, η2 = .18), whereas
legitimate power (F(1, 117) = 2.51, p = .12) did not. Similarly, legitimate
power affected voluntary cooperation (F(1, 117) = 27.47, p < .001, η2 = .19),
whereas coercive power (F(1, 117) = 1.14, p = .29) had no effect. There was no
impact of coercive power on the perception of an antagonistic climate (F(1,
117) = 1.80, p = .18), but there was an impact related to legitimate power (F(1,
117) = 75.86, p < .001, η2 = .39)—high legitimate power led to low perceptions
of an antagonistic climate. High legitimate power also led to perceptions of a
more distinct service climate (F(1, 117) = 84.93, p < .001, η2 = .42), but there
was no effect of coercive power (F(1, 117) = 0.45, p = .51). The respective
means are displayed in Table 4.
E. DISCUSSION
Study 2 expands and partly confirms the findings of Study 1. Unlike Study
1a, coercive power had no significant impact on intended tax compliance, but
similar to Study 1b, we found legitimate power to have a significant impact.
Specifically, high coercive power and high legitimate power combined gen-
erated the highest intended tax compliance (significantly higher than the
combination of high coercive power and low legitimate power and the com-
bination of low coercive power and low legitimate power [mean differences
95 percent CIs (0.3, 2.1) and (0.5, 2.4)]). Additionally, if high legitimate
power and low coercive power were wielded in combination, intended tax
compliance was high. Tax authorities holding high coercive power but low
legitimate power induced less intended tax compliance. The results indicated
that the wielding of coercive and legitimate power in combination could lead
to the perception of especially high legitimate expert power and diminished
feelings of coercion. This finding supports earlier findings (Kogler et al. 2013;
Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler, 2010) that power combined with trustwor-
thiness is producing highest tax contributions.
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the present research was to examine the impact of coercive and
legitimate power on intended tax compliance. In the experimental studies
presented here, coercive power and legitimate power are shown to affect
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intended tax compliance, if applied separately (Table 5). However, if we
apply both qualities of power in combination, we find legitimate power, but
not coercive power, to have an impact on intended tax compliance. Legiti-
mate power seems to be more relevant than coercive power, as predicted by
Tyler (2006). Legitimate power and coercive power in combination might be
perceived as legitimate expert power, inducing trust by creating the impres-
sion that exploitative free riders will be penalized expertly while supporting
honest taxpayers in order to elicit the highest intended tax compliance. In
cases in which only legitimate power is applied, authorities are perceived
as benevolent but without sufficient measures at their disposal to prosecute
free riders. Their measures are based on a “toothless theory” (Ariel 2012, 39)
inducing some intended tax compliance but at a lesser degree than when
exercising the two qualities of power in combination. Authoritarian
leadership—in this scenario, the application of only coercive power—
resulted in lower intended tax compliance. On the other hand, laissez-faire
authorities that wield neither coercive power nor legitimate power are inca-
pable of levying taxes and so generate the least intended tax compliance.
A secondary aim of this research was to investigate the underlying psycho-
logical processes of coercive power and of legitimate power and their influ-
ence on trust, motivations to comply, and the perceived climate. Coercive
power was not seen to have had the expected negative impact on implicit trust
in either study (cf. Nooteboom 2002; Kramer 1999) or the predicted positive
effect on the antagonistic climate in Study 2, but its effects were in line with
the assumptions regarding enforced compliance (Table 5). The absence of a
negative impact of coercive power on implicit trust could stem from a
manipulation and an assessment problem. As implicit trust is a concept
that develops over time, both as an automatic and a learning process, the
Table 5. Summary of Results for Coercive Power, Legitimate Power, and
Combined Power Experiments (Study 1a, 1b and 2)
Study
1a 1b 2
Coercive
power
Legitimate
power
Coercive
power
Legitimate
power
Intended tax compliance + + 0 +
Implicit trust 0 0 0
Reason-based trust + 0 +
Enforced compliance + + 0
Voluntary cooperation + 0 +
Antagonistic climate + 0 −
Service climate + 0 +
Note: + . . . significant mean differences, whereby high power determined higher means than low
power; − . . . significant mean differences, whereby high power determined lower means than low
power; 0 . . . no significant mean differences.
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authorities described in the fictitious scenarios might not have been able to
establish or destroy implicit trust. In future research, scenarios should take
into account the fact that the development of implicit trust requires positive
past experiences with tax authorities. The absence of an impact of coercive
power on perceptions of an antagonistic climate and the fact that legitimate
power effected this perception negatively in Study 2 suggest that the climate
is not stimulated by coercive power but is, in fact, inhibited by legitimate
power. This is also supported by the results of Study 1b, which show that
high legitimate power led to significantly lower perceptions of an antagonistic
climate (F(1, 60) = 5.98, p < .05, η2 = .09; note that coercive power was not
manipulated in this study). Again, the reason could be that as soon as
legitimate power is wielded, coercive power and legitimate power exercised in
combination are perceived as legitimate expert power and thereby act to
reduce any potential feelings of coercion. Future research should seek to
investigate and confirm this hypothesis.
As predicted, legitimate power affected reason-based trust in both studies,
supporting the earlier finding that legitimate sanction systems stimulate trust
(Mulder et al. 2006). We also confirm in both studies that legitimate power
has a positive impact on voluntary cooperation and on perceptions of a
service climate. For the impact of legitimate power, the assumptions are
confirmed; however, assumptions surrounding the impact of coercive power
require modification. The perceptions of coercive power and the respective
behavioral intentions are dependent on the presence of legitimate power.
In addition to its merits, this article also has certain limitations. The
recruitment of the participants for the studies—convenience samples of
acquaintances of university members—might have led to a specific selection
effect. Participants were, on average, better educated than the general
population. However, the studies present first theoretical confirmations;
additional research with different samples will have to follow. As with all
laboratory experiments working with scenarios, the external validity of the
presented studies is lower than with, for instance, field experiments. Never-
theless, conducting a field experiment manipulating low and high coercive
and/or legitimate power seems impossible. For example, punishing some
taxpayers, while others knowingly get away with tax evasion, or granting
some taxpayers support, while neglecting others, seems a highly unlikely
behavior of tax authorities. Furthermore, in such a field experiment, other
influencing factors, such as regional specifics, could not be kept constant. The
present experimental design using scenarios only allows specific investigation
of the impact of the forms of power, systematically holding other factors
stable. In future experiments, this needs to be extended; in the laboratory, not
only intended but actual experimental tax behavior should be assessed.
Another area for future research will be not only to describe coercive and/or
legitimate tax authorities but to let participants experience coercive and/or
legitimate power of tax authorities. It can be argued that, in both Study 1 and
Study 2, the descriptions of coercive and legitimate power differ slightly: the
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coercive power scenario is a bit shorter than the legitimate power scenario. In
future studies, coercive power and legitimate power will have to be phrased
comparably, investigating whether researchers can successfully replicate the
results of Study 2. However, the current results are plausible, support the
assumptions of Tyler (2006), and back up existing findings (e.g. Kogler et al.
2013; Kogler, Muehlbacher, and Kirchler 2011; Muehlbacher, Kirchler, and
Schwarzenberger 2011; Muehlbacher and Kirchler 2010; Wahl, Kastlunger,
and Kirchler, 2010). These findings show that legitimate power, with both
high and low degrees of coercive power, is more effective at inducing tax
compliance than is coercive power with low legitimate power.
For practitioners, the results of Study 1 and Study 2 are interesting and
applicable to their work. They show that coercive power and legitimate
power have an impact on intended tax compliance, but if exercised in com-
bination, legitimate power is able to alter perceptions of coercive power.
Authorities should concentrate on strategies of good governance while simul-
taneously seeking to protect honest taxpayers from tax evaders. Based on
theoretical assumptions, they would establish a service climate, reduce
antagonistic interactions, and increase voluntary cooperation, as to secure
tax revenues and characterize the societal climate by good and respectful
relations between tax authorities and taxpayers. Neither authoritarian lead-
ership nor good governance alone would be able to produce these results.
Authoritarian leadership would generate less tax revenues and a climate of
mistrust in society; good governance would contribute to a friendly climate
but could not deliver comparable tax revenues. This finding strongly sup-
ports the responsive regulation approach (Braithwaite 2001), which argues
that taxpayers need to be addressed differently depending to the social dis-
tance between them and authorities.
Based on the findings, we can say that supportive procedures should have
an impact on taxpayers’ trust in tax authorities and that coercion is impor-
tant as long as it directs toward free riders. If coercion or supportive proce-
dures are applied in isolation, some tax revenues could be secured, but if the
two qualities of power were applied in combination, increasing and voluntary
contributions could be expected.
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